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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the drafting of the 1982 People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)
Constitution (“PRC Constitution” or “Constitution”), the creation of a
specialized constitutional supervision organ1 has been a topic of discussion
*
Associate Dean for Global Programs, Director of the East Asian Legal Studies
Program, and Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. An
early version of this article was presented at a conference on “China’s Legal Construction
Program at 40 Years: Towards an Autonomous Legal System” at the University of
Michigan (October 2019). I thank the conference organizers and participants for their
helpful comments. I also thank Susan Finder, Carl Minzner, and Changhao Wei for
thoughtful exchanges and suggestions, and Dongying Zhang for excellent research
assistance, as I revised the article in early 2022. All errors and omissions are my own.
1

Cai Dingjian, Constitutional Supervision and Interpretation in the People’s
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in China’s political-legal reform process. Following the turmoil of the Mao
era, the 1982 Constitution was promulgated to reinforce the new
leadership’s commitment to stability and modernization.2 Participants in the
drafting process argued for a specialized organ to ensure the Constitution
would not be ignored in practice. They proposed a range of models,
including a constitutional court, procuratorial supervision of the
Constitution, and a National People’s Congress (“NPC”) constitutional
committee. 3 Although provisions for an NPC constitutional committee
appeared in drafts of the new Constitution as late as the spring of 1982,
Deng Xiaoping ultimately rejected them.4 Despite Deng’s early opposition,
proposals for a constitutional committee continued to bubble up throughout
the reform era.
In 2018, China’s leaders took steps to address this unresolved reform
issue. While China’s 2018 constitutional amendments attracted widespread
attention, foreign commentators focused on provisions eliminating term
limits for the state president, creating a new state anti-corruption organ, and
enhancing the constitutional status of the Communist Party of China (the
“Party”) and “Xi Jinping Thought.” 5 Another, largely overlooked,
amendment reconstituted one of the NPC special committees as the
“Constitution and Law Committee,” and a subsequent National People’s
Congress Standing Committee (“NPCSC”) decision tasked this Committee
with expansive new constitutional functions. 6 Chinese commentators
characterized this reform as the realization of four decades of efforts to

Republic of China, 9 J. CHINESE L. 219, 227 (1995) (describing the widely held
understanding that constitutional supervision includes review of the constitutionality of
legislation and other state acts and the resolution of jurisdictional disputes among state
organs).
2

William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH.
U. L. Q. 707, 724-29 (1985).
3

Liu Songshan (刘松山),1981 Nian: Taidong Er Weixing de Xianfa Weiyuanhui
Sheji (1981 年 ： 胎 动 而 未 形 的 宪 法 委 员 会 设 计 )[1981: Embryonic but Inchoate
Designs for a Constitutional Committee], ZHONGGUO XIANZHENG WANG (中国宪政
网)[CHINA CONSTITUTIONALISM NET], Mar. 13, 2011, §§ II-III.
4

Id. § III.

5

Jerome Cohen, Xi Jinping Amends China’s Constitution, LAWFARE BLOG, Mar.
7, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/xi-jinping-amends-chinas-constitution; Feng Lin,
The 2018 Constitutional Amendments, CHINA PERSPECTIVES, no. 1 (2019), at 11-21; Taisu
Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, China’s Turn Toward Law, 59 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 306, 346-65
(2019).
6

It is difficult to find other foreign scholarly or media sources that reference the
Committee. The NPC Observer website discusses the Constitution and Law Committee in
several posts. NPC OBSERVER, https://npcobserver.com/(last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
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strengthen constitutional supervision.7 In a related step, NPC entities began
publishing annual reports on China’s system for reviewing legislation and
promulgated detailed new procedures for such reviews.
These developments raise a puzzling question in China’s legal
development. After deflecting calls for a constitutional committee for nearly
four decades, why did China’s leaders decide to create one at a moment
when Xi Jinping is presiding over a significant tightening of the country’s
political-legal environment? This article argues that the recent reforms
should be understood as components of a broad constitutional
rationalization designed to refine the Party’s narrative of constitutional
supremacy, strengthen the legal system as an instrument to discipline the
bureaucracy, and contain citizen constitutional argument. The reforms
demonstrate the Party’s confidence that it can reap the legitimacy and
governance benefits of building new constitutional supervision
infrastructure without incurring material risks that citizens might leverage
such infrastructure to challenge Party authority.
Part II provides a brief overview of legislative, judicial, and popular
initiatives to strengthen enforcement of the PRC Constitution prior to 2012.
Part III introduces the policy and legislative history of the Constitution and
Law Committee, discusses the Committee’s constitutional status and
operation, and surveys corresponding developments in China’s system for
reviewing legislation. Part IV explores leadership motivations for these
reforms and provides an initial assessment of the likely impact of the
reforms for rights enforcement and the implementation of central laws and
policies. As Part IV explains, China’s leaders created a constitutional
committee and enhanced transparency in the filing and review system only
after undertaking a multidimensional effort to shape China’s ideological
landscape on constitutional issues, marginalize constitutional rights
activists, and strengthen the constitutional status of the Party. To build
mechanisms for the interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution,
China’s leaders had to first weaken the Constitution as a potential platform
for promoting fundamental rights.

7

See, e.g., Mo Jihong (莫纪宏), Hexianxing Shencha Jizhi Jianshe de 40 Nian (合宪性
审查机制建设的 40 年) [Forty Years of Constructing a Constitutionality Review
Mechanism], BEIJING LIANHE DAXUE XUEBAO (北京联合大学学报) [J. BEIJING UNION
UNIV.], vol. 16, no. 3 (July 2018), at 22; Wang Yu (王宇); Jiedu Quanguo Renda Xianfa
He Falü Weiyuanhui Xianfa Jiandu: 38 Nian Hou Yinglai Xin Jumian (解读全国人大宪
法和法律委员会宪法监督：38 年后迎来新局面) [Deciphering Constitutional
Supervision of the National People’s Congress Constitution and Law Committee: After
38 Years, Welcoming a New Phase], NANFANG ZHOUMO (南方周末) [S. WEEKEND],
Mar. 22, 2018, http://www.infzm.com/contents/134359.
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A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION
SYSTEM PRIOR TO 2012

When it promulgated the 1982 Constitution, China adopted the
Soviet system of centralizing constitutional supervision in a supreme
legislature. Specifically, it vested the NPC and NPCSC with general
constitutional supervision authority, and it granted the NPCSC power to
interpret the PRC Constitution and to annul lower-level legislation that is
inconsistent with the Constitution.8 Although the NPC and NPCSC have
implemented some constitutional provisions by promulgating legislation,9
they have not carried out their other duties to interpret the Constitution and
police violations in a systematic manner.10 Deficiencies in constitutional
rights enforcement have prompted scholars to question the Constitution’s
legal significance. 11 Corresponding efforts to strengthen constitutional
supervision in China have followed three basic tracks: enhancing the NPC’s
constitutional supervision infrastructure; “judicializing” the Constitution;
and using constitutional argument as a tool of social mobilization.
A. Efforts to Enhance the NPC’s Constitutional Supervision
Infrastructure
Since 1982, Chinese citizens have repeatedly revived proposals for
a specialized constitutional committee under the NPC. Scholars and NPC
officials raised proposals for such a committee on several occasions in the
1980s. They continued such efforts during the drafting of the 2000
Legislation Law and the 2006 People’s Congress Standing Committee
Supervision Law. 12 Proposals for a constitutional committee have taken
different forms, from a committee with status equal to the NPCSC (to ensure
8

XIANFA art. 62, §§ 2, 4 (1982) (China); id. art. 67, §§ 1, 7.

9
Yan Lin and Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Interpretation in Lawmaking:
China’s Invisible Constitutional Enforcement Mechanism, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 467, 467
(2015).
10

Fan Jinxue ( 范 进 学 ), Quanguo Renda Xianfa He Falü Weiyuanhui de
Gongneng Yu Shiming (全国人大宪法和法律委员会的功能与使命)[The Function and
Mission of the NPC Constitution and Law Committee], HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE
XUEBAO(华东政法大学学报)[EAST CHINA U. POL. L. J.], no. 4 (2018), 16-17.
11

See, e.g., Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), Zhongguo Xianzheng de Lujing Yu
Kunjing (中国宪政的路径与困境) [The Paths of Chinese Constitutionalism and Their
Limits], May 8, 2011, CHENYOUXI XUESHU WANG (陈有西学术网); Donald C. Clarke,
Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When Is a Riddle Just a Mistake?, in
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 93-121 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
12

Cai, supra note 1, at 241-43; Mo, supra note 7, at 16; Li Yahong, The Lawmaking Law: A Solution to the Problems of the Chinese Legislative System? 30 HONG
KONG L. J. 120, 133-36 (2000); Lin Chufang (林楚方), Jiandufa: Minzhu Zhengzhi
Shengzhang Dian （监督法：民主政治生长点） [Supervision Law: Growing Point for
Democratic Politics], NANFANG ZHOUMO （南方周末） [S. WEEKEND], Sept. 6, 2002.
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constitutional review of national laws) to an NPC special committee with
only advisory functions.13
While calls for an NPC constitutional committee went unfulfilled
prior to the 2018 constitutional amendment, NPC organs did strengthen
systems for the filing and review of legislation. “Filing and review” refers
to a system pursuant to which legislation and judicial interpretations are
recorded with supervisory organs and then reviewed for consistency with
higher-level legislation including, in theory, the Constitution. 14 Although
the Constitution sets out a basic framework of review powers, the filing and
review system developed more fully only after the NPC adopted the PRC
Legislation Law in 2000. This statute included basic standards and
procedures for filing and review. It also provided citizens with a concrete
statutory right to raise proposals for the review of legislation.15
The Legislation Law spurred further institutional reforms. In 2004,
the NPCSC’s work organ, the Legislative Affairs Commission (“LAC”),
established a Filing and Review Office to manage review work. NPC organs
issued several internal work procedures for reviewing legislation from 2000
to 2005. The State Council and local people’s congresses expanded their
own filing and review systems in the 2000s and early 2010s. The NPCSC
alone received more than 8,000 pieces of legislation for review from 2002
to 2011.16 After the 2003 Sun Zhigang incident17 focused public interest in
the Legislation Law’s citizen proposal mechanism, citizens raised more than
900 proposals for the review of legislation from 2004 to 2011.18
In practice, the operation of the filing and review system has been
problematic. Filing and review organs suffer from organizational and
political capacity deficits, and, until recently, neither the NPCSC nor its
subordinate offices issued public responses to citizen review proposals. As
a work organ, the Filing and Review Office does not exercise any formal
constitutional authority. It has carried out its functions primarily by
coordinating efforts to identify conflicts in legislation and addressing the
13

Guobin Zhu, Constitutional Review in China: An Unaccomplished Project or a
Mirage? 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625, 650-52 (2010).
14
Keith Hand, Understanding China’s System for Legislative Conflicts: Capacity
Challenges and the Search for Legislative Harmony, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 139, 139-216
(2013).
15

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifafa (中华人民共和国立法法) [People’s
Republic of China Legislation Law], adopted Mar. 15, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015, art.
99, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG [CHINA NPC NET].
16

Hand, supra note 14, at 176-79 and accompanying notes (relying on an
extensive body of Chinese official sources to compile statistics for filed legislation).
17
18

See infra part II(3).

GUIFANXING WENJIAN BEI’AN SHENCHA ZHIDU: LILUN YU SHIWU (规范性文
件 备 案 审 查 制 度 ： 理 论 与 实 务 ) [THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REGULATORY
DOCUMENT FILING AND REVIEW] 19 (2011).
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most pressing conflicts through an inefficient, behind-the-scenes process of
cajoling promulgating organs to self-correct.19 Although some inconsistent
legislation was amended or repealed through this process, citizens criticized
the system for its lack of transparency, and scholars debated whether it
should be considered a nascent form of constitutional review.20
B. “Judicialization” of the Constitution
The PRC Constitution does not vest the people’s courts with explicit
constitutional supervision authority. Courts do not enjoy the power to
interpret the Constitution or to annul legislation that conflicts with it.
However, the question of whether courts may apply the Constitution as a
source of law in deciding cases has generated significant debate. Some
scholars cited Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) replies from 1955 and 1986
to argue that courts could not directly apply constitutional provisions as a
source of law. 21 While courts occasionally made brief reference to the
Constitution in their judgments, such cases were limited both in number and
impact.22 Beginning in the 1990s, Chinese scholars began to challenge these
jurisprudential assumptions and advocate for judicial application of the
Constitution. 23 As Han Liu has shown, changes in the reception and
dissemination of American constitutional theory in China contributed to this
enhanced focus on judicial review.24
Interest in judicialization of the Constitution intensified in 2001. In
that year, the SPC authorized a higher people’s court to apply the
constitutional right to education to resolve a civil dispute. The SPC’s Qi
19

Hand, supra note 14, at 202-11 (noting that this process is consistent with norms
of consensus building and avoids damaging the face and authority of promulgating organs).
20

See, e.g., Zhu, supra note 13; Wang Kai(王锴), Bei’an Shencha: Zhongguo
de Weixian Shencha? (备案审查：中国的违宪审查?] [Filing and Review: China’s
Constitutional Review?], in XIANFA QUANLI YU XIANZHENG ( 宪 法 权 利 与 宪 政 )
[CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM], 267-313 (Fu Hualing (傅华伶)&
Zhu Guobin(朱国斌) eds., 2012).
21

Guobin Zhu, Weak Courts, Weak Rights: Assessing the Realisation of
Constitutional Rights in the PRC Courts, 43 HONG KONG L. J. 713, 721-24 (2013).
22

Tong Zhiwei (童之伟), Xianfa Shiyong Ying Yixun Xianfa Benshen Guiding
de Lujing (宪法适用应依循宪法本身规定的路径) [Application of the Constitution
Should Follow the Path of the Constitution’s Own Provisions], ZHONGGUO FAXUE(中国
法学) [CHINA LEGAL STUD.], no. 6 (2008), at 28–29.
23

Thomas Kellogg, The Constitution in the Courtroom: Constitutional
Development and Civil Litigation in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 340, 347-354 (Margaret Y.K. Woo and Mary E.
Gallagher eds., 2011).
24

Han Liu, Regime Centered and Court-Centered Understandings: The Reception
of American Constitutional Law in Contemporary China, 68 AMER. J. COMP. L. 95 (2020),
§ II.
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Yuling reply focused scholarly attention on judicial application of the
Constitution as a breakthrough for constitutional supervision in China.25
SPC Vice President Huang Songyou, the author of the Qi Yuling reply,
encouraged such discourse by referencing Marbury v. Madison in an article
discussing the significance of the reply.26 Reformist lawyers brought new
constitutional cases in an effort to expand the precedent, and Chinese courts
cited the Constitution as a legal basis for their judgments in some civil and
administrative cases.27 These developments sparked further debate about
the appropriateness and feasibility of judicial application of the Constitution
in China’s system.28
The Party-state took steps to quash this nascent judicialization
movement. Party-state leaders viewed judicialization of the Constitution as
a “latent threat,” and internal notices directed courts not to take the Qi Yuling
reply as precedent.29 Then, in 2008, the SPC formally repealed the reply,
and subsequent SPC directives reinforced the understanding that courts
should not cite the Constitution as a source of law.30 As recent scholarship
demonstrates, some courts have pushed the boundaries of these restrictions
in practice. For example, Daniel Sprick has documented numerous
post-2008 cases in which Chinese courts cited constitutional provisions, not
as an explicit legal basis for their judgments, but as a gloss in their
reasoning. 31 Courts also find ways to implement constitutional norms
indirectly through the application of national statutes and review of
administrative actions.32 However, given the Party-state’s reaction to the
25

Mo, supra note 7, at 17.

26

Huang Songyou (黄松有), Xianfa Sifahua Jiqi Yiyi—Cong Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan Jintian de Yige «Pifu» Tanqi (宪法司法化及其意义-从最高人民法院今天的一
个《批复》谈起) [Judicialization of the Constitution and its Significance: A Discussion
Beginning with Today’s SPC “Reply”], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S
COURT DAILY], Aug. 13, 2001.
27

Mo, supra note 7, at 18; Kellogg, supra note 23, at 367-76; Keith Hand,
Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary China, 7 U. PA. EAST ASIA L. R. 51,
70-72 (2011) (discussing one court’s application of the Constitution to annul an
administrative decision).
28

Zhu, supra note 21, at 717-722.

29

Zhang, supra note 11, § 3.

30
Daniel Sprick, Judicialization of the Chinese Constitution Revisited: Empirical
Evidence from Court Data, 19 CHINA REVIEW 41, 44-45 (2019).
31
32

Id. at 41-67.

See, e.g., Wen-Chen Chang & David S. Law, Constitutional Dissonance in
China, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 476, 500-02 (Gary Jacobsohn &
Miguel Schor eds., 2018) (arguing that the absence of judicial review does not preclude
courts from applying constitutional norms in other ways); see also He Haibo, The Dawn of
the Due Process Principle in China, 22 J. ASIAN L. 57, 95-108 (2008) (discussing the
judicial development of due process norms in the adjudication of administrative cases).
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movement to judicialize the Constitution and subsequent efforts to contain
constitutional activism,33 there is little prospect that courts will emerge as a
robust constitutional supervision institution.34
C. Popular Constitutionalism
Chinese citizens have raised constitutional arguments to generate
bottom-up pressure on the Party-state to implement the Constitution. This
advocacy takes a range of forms. 35 Legal scholars have published
compilations of constitutional cases, books, media commentaries, and open
letters to discuss the constitutional dimensions of current events and
strengthen public awareness of the Constitution. Citizens engaged in social
protest sometimes reference the Constitution. “Rights defense” lawyers
focus on specific cases or issues that generate public attention and
controversy, leverage the Internet and media to frame the issues in
constitutional terms, and then deploy constitutional arguments to press for
reform. The use of legal mechanisms, such as filing court cases or raising
proposals for review of legislation, is sometimes part of these efforts. But
rights lawyers do not necessarily expect a legal outcome. Instead, their goal
is to use constitutional argument to shape public opinion and, over the long
term, to cultivate new interpretations of the Constitution in the public
consciousness.
The “Sun Zhigang incident” was a watershed in the development of
popular constitutionalism in China. In 2003, after the death of a young man
in custody, three Chinese scholars filed a historic constitutional challenge
to a regulation that empowered state authorities to detain and repatriate
some internal migrants. As public pressure mounted, the State Council
repealed the regulation. In the wake of the Sun Zhigang incident, legal
activists refined rights defense and public interest litigation strategies. In
discussing such strategies, Xu Zhiyong, one of the scholar petitioners in the
Sun Zhigang incident, noted the importance of “raising the big flag of the
Constitution” and offering citizen interpretations of the Constitution to
enforce rights.36
33

See infra Part IV.

34

Mo, supra note 7, at 18 (explaining that mainstream scholars have abandoned
judicial review as a path for constitutional review breakthroughs); Fu Hualing and Zhai
Xiaobo, What Makes the Chinese Constitution Socialist?, 16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 655, 657
(2018) (concluding that after repeal of the Qi Yuling reply, prospects for judicial
enforcement of constitutional rights vanished quietly).
35

For detailed discussions of social mobilization strategies and related events, see
Zhang, supra note 11 and Hand, supra note 27.
36

Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Ba Xianfa Biancheng Changshi—Zai Fada Xianfa
Weiquan Yu Xianfa Jieshi Yantaohui Shang de Fayan (把宪法变成常识—在法大宪法维
权 与 宪 法 解 释 研 讨 会 上 的 发 言 ) [Transform the Constitution into a Common
Understanding—Comments at the China University of Politics and Law Rights Defense
and Constitutional Interpretation Workshop], XU ZHIYONG BLOG, June 27, 2008, (on file
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Subsequent application of rights defense strategies helped to
catalyze modest reform successes. For example, after a woman named Tang
Fuzhen self-immolated to protest the demolition of her home in 2009, legal
scholars challenged the constitutionality and legality of China’s urban
expropriation regulations. After a lengthy drafting process, the State
Council adopted new regulations on urban expropriations in 2011. 37 As
discussed in Section IV, senior Party leaders viewed the rights defense
movement as a threat, and they have taken steps to marginalize rights
defense lawyers and narrow space for citizen constitutional argument in the
public sphere.
III.

REFORMS TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION SYSTEM UNDER
XI JINPING
A. The Policy and Legislative History of the Constitution and
Law Committee

As Xi Jinping took the reins of Party-state power, he elevated the
Party’s rhetorical commitment to the Constitution in several respects. In
widely publicized speeches in 2012 and 2013, Xi emphasized that “ruling
the country according to law is first ruling the country according to the
Constitution” and stressed the importance of strengthening mechanisms to
supervise implementation of the Constitution. 38 While these early
statements did not depart significantly from those of past leaders, the 18th
Party Central Committee subsequently incorporated Xi’s rhetoric into
several key documents. In a communiqué issued after its third meeting (or
plenum) in 2013, the Central Committee declared that China “will further
improve supervision mechanisms and procedures for the implementation of
the Constitution and raise the comprehensive implementation of the
Constitution to a new level.”39 In its historic Fourth Plenum decision on
with author).
37

Hand, supra note 27, at 121-23.

38

Xi Jinping (习近平), Zai Shoudu Gejie Jinian Xianxing Xianfa Gongbu
Shixing 30 Zhounian Dahuishang de Jianghua（在首都各界纪念现行宪法公布施行 30
周 年 大 会 上 的 讲 话 ）[Xi Jinping: Speech at the Conference in the Capital to
Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Implementation of the Current Constitution],
XINHUA
WANG（ 新 华 网 ）[XINHUA
NET],
Dec.
4,
2012,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-12/04/c_113907206.htm; Xi Jinping Qiangdiao:
Yifa Zhiguo Yifa Zhizheng Yifa Xingzheng Gongtong Tuijin(习近平强调：依法治国依法
执政依法行政共同推进)[Xi Jinping Emphasizes: Promote Ruling the Country According
to Law, Governing According to Law, and Administration According to Law Together],
ZHONGGUO ZHENGFU WANG ( 中 国 政 府 网 )[CHINESE GOV’T NET], Feb. 24, 2013,
http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-02/24/content_2338937.htm.
39

Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda
Wenti de Jueding (中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) [CCP Central
Committee Decision on Several Major Questions in Comprehensively Deepening Reform],

146

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

[Vol. 23:2

legal reform the following year, the Central Committee included a more
specific call to “perfect the constitutional supervision system of the National
People’s Congress and its Standing Committee,” “complete procedures and
mechanisms for constitutional interpretation,” “strengthen the filing and
review system,” and “cancel and correct normative documents that violate
the Constitution or the law.”40
Initial reforms following the Fourth Plenum suggested that Chinese
leaders were prepared to take only modest steps to effectuate the
constitutional directives in the Plenum decision. Although prominent jurists
such as former SPC President Xiao Yang continued to advocate for a
constitutional committee, the NPC passed up an opportunity to implement
this reform when it amended the Legislation Law in 2015. 41 While the
Legislation Law amendments promoted transparency in the review process
and strengthened the legal foundation for filing and review, the NPC did not
include provisions for a specialized constitutional supervision organ.42
However, subsequent Party texts signaled that more substantial
institutional reforms were under consideration. In his lengthy report to the
19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping stressed the need to improve “the Chinese
socialist system of laws, at the heart of which is the Constitution” and
specifically called for “strengthening constitutional implementation and
supervision, moving forward with constitutional review work, and
safeguarding the authority of the Constitution.”43 This was the first time the

Nov. 12, 2013, § 30, ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG XINWEN WANG (中国共产党新闻
网
)[CHINESE
COMMUNIST
PARTY
NEWS
NET],
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/1115/c64094-23559163.html.
40

Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Zhiguo Ruogan
Zhongda Wenti de Jueding (中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决
定 )[CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in
Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country According to the Law Forward], § 2(i),
(Oct.
23,
2014)
[hereinafter
Fourth
Plenum
Decision],
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c1001-25926893.html.
41

Zuigao Fayuan Yuan Yuanzhang Jianyi Zai Quanguo Renda Zengshe Xianfa
Weiyuanhui ( 最高法院原院长建议在全国人大增设宪法委员会 ) [Former SPC
President Recommends Adding a Constitutional Committee in the NPC], BEIJING
QINGNIAN BAO (北京青年报) [BEIJING YOUTH DAILY], Nov. 8, 2014.
42

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Lifafa” de Jueding (全国人民代表大会关于修改“中华人民共和国立法法”
的决定) [Decision of the NPC on Amending the Legislation Law of the PRC], adopted
March. 15, 2015, LAWINFOCHINA, http://lawinfochina.com.
43

Xi Jinping, Gen. Sec’y of Chinese Communist Party, Secure a Decisive Victory
in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, delivered to the 19th
National Congress of the CCP, Oct. 18, 2017, § VI(4).
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term “constitutional review” (合宪审查) appeared in such a Party report.44
In January 2018, the Party Central Committee proposed
amendments to the Constitution, which the NPCSC immediately approved
for consideration by the full NPC. Interestingly, the Party’s amendment
proposal did not make any reference to a Constitution and Law
Committee.45 However, in a lengthy “Plan to Deepen Reform of Party and
State Institutions” issued the following month, the Central Committee
called for the name of the NPC Law Committee to be changed to the
“Constitution and Law Committee.” The Plan also specified that the duties
of the Committee should be expanded to include not only “undertaking the
unified deliberation of draft laws” (a principal function of the existing Law
Committee), but also “promoting implementation of the Constitution,
developing constitutional interpretation, advancing constitutional review,
strengthening constitutional supervision, and coordinating publicity of the
Constitution.”46
The NPC and NPCSC subsequently implemented this Party
proposal. In early March 2018, the NPC amended Article 70 of the
Constitution to change the name of the “Law Committee” to the
“Constitution and Law Committee.” 47 Then, in June 2018, the NPCSC
issued a decision establishing the new constitutional duties of the
Committee as set out in the Party Central Committee’s institutional reform
plan. It also confirmed that the Committee would carry out the duties of the
former Law Committee referenced in other legislation.48 Over the next few
44

Lu Yijie( 卢 义 杰 ), Liu Shixin( 刘 世 昕 )& Yang Jie ( 杨 杰 ), ‘Falü
Weiyuanhui’ Ni Gengming Wei ‘Xianfa He Falü Weiyuanhui’ Yiweizhe Shenme? (法律委
员会拟更名为“宪法和法律委员会”意味着什么?) [What Does the Draft Name
Change of the Law Committee to the Constitution and Law Committee Mean?], ZHONG
QING ZAIXIAN ( 中 青 在 线 ) [CHINA YOUTH ONLINE], Mar. 8, 2018,
http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2018-03/08/nw.D110000zgqnb_20180308_3-03.htm.
45

Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai Xianfa
Bufen Neirong de Jianyi (中国共产党中央委员会关于修改宪法部分内容的建议)
[Proposal of the CCP Central Committee for Amendment of Part of the Constitution],
issued Jan. 26, 2018, XINHUA WANG ( 新 华 网 )[XINHUA NET], Feb. 25, 2018,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-02/25/c_1122451187.htm.
46

Zhonggong Zhongyang Yinfa “Shenhua Dang He Guojia Jigou Gaige Fang’an”
(中共中央印发 《深化党和国家机构改革方案》) [CCP Central Committee Publishes
a “Plan for Reform of Party and State Organs”], issued Feb. 28, 2018, § 23, XINHUA
WANG(新华网)[XINHUA NET], Mar. 21, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/201803/21/c_1122570517.htm.
47

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xiuzhengan (中华人民共和国宪法修正案)
[Amendment to the PRC Constitution], adopted Mar. 11, 2018, art. 44, XINHUA WANG (新
华 网 )
[XINHUA
NET],
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/201803/11/c_1122521235.htm.
48

Guanyu Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xianfa He Falü Weiyuanhui Zhize

148

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

[Vol. 23:2

years, the NPC harmonized such legislation by incorporating the
Committee’s new constitutional functions.49
B. The Status and Operation of the Constitution and Law
Committee
The Constitution and Law Committee has formal constitutional
status, but it exercises only advisory powers. Article 70 of the Constitution,
as revised, establishes the Constitution and Law Committee as one of ten
NPC special committees. Special committees assist the NPC and NPCSC
by proposing or reviewing draft legislation and by assisting in the
post-promulgation review of lower-level legislation.50 The NPCSC’s June
2018 decision confirmed that the Constitution and Law Committee would
undertake new functions related to constitutional review and interpretation.
However, the Committee remains subject to the supervision of the NPCSC
when the NPC is not in session, and it has no independent power to issue
binding constitutional decisions or interpretations. Instead, it is an advisory
organ that assists the NPC and NPCSC in carrying out their constitutional
functions.51
As an NPC special committee, the Constitutional and Law
Committee is made up entirely of NPC deputies. It is chaired by Li Fei,
former head of the NPCSC Hong Kong Basic Law Committee and former
Vice Chair of the Law Committee. Most of the Committee’s eighteen
members hold concurrent positions in other institutions. Current Committee
members include an SPC Vice President, two legal scholars, three deputies
with concurrent positions in the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission
(“LAC”), the head of the All China Lawyers Association, three People’s
Wenti de Jueding (关于全国人民代表大会宪法和法律委员会职责问题的决定)
[Decision on the Duties of the NPC Constitution and Law Committee], adopted June 6,
2018, XINHUA WANG (新华网) [XINHUA NET], http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/201806/22/c_129899141.htm.
49

See, e.g., amendments to the NPC Organic Law incorporating the Committee
changes. Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zuzhifa de Juding (全国人民代表大会关于修改中华人
民共和国全国人民代表大会组织法) [National People's Congress Decision to Amend the
“PRC National People's Congress Organic Law”], adopted March 11, 2021, art. 33,
ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG ( 中 国 人 大 网 ) [CHINA NPC NET],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202103/2d8d19c686234f42addcd2a0592bf809.shtml.
50

Michael W. Dowdle, The Constitutional Development and Operations of the
National People’s Congress, 11 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 1, 48-52 (1997); PRC Legislation
Law, supra note 15, arts. 99-101.
51

XIANFA art. 70, §§ 2, 4 (1982) (China); Yu Wenhao(于文豪), Xianfa He Falü
Weiyuanhui Hexianxing Shencha Zhize De Zhankai (宪法和法律委员会合宪性审查职
责的展开) [The Development of the Constitution and Law Committee’s Constitutionality
Review Duties], ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) [CHINA LEGAL STUDIES], no. 6 (2018), §
2(2).
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Liberation Army representatives, and two State Council legal specialists.52
The NPC Organic Law authorizes the Committee to appoint legal experts
to advise it, although it is not clear the Committee has done so.53
The LAC, a professional work organ of the NPCSC, provides staff
support for the Committee. The LAC maintains 11 specialized offices and
a staff of about 200 professionals. It performs a range of legislative research,
drafting, and review work for the NPC and its special committees.54 It also
responds to inquiries from other state organs on concrete issues of law.55 In
late 2018, the LAC established a new “Constitution Office” to support the
Committee’s work and research issues related to the Committee’s new
functions.56
52

Xianfa He Falü Weiyuanhui (宪法和法律委员会) [Constitution and Law
Committee], ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG ( 中 国 人 大 网 ) [CHINA NPC NET],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c34375/xffl_2.shtml; Wang, supra note 7. One of the legal
scholars appointed to the Committee at its inception, Renmin University Vice Dean Yu
Zhigang, was later indicted on bribery charges and removed as an NPC delegate and
Committee member. Weiyuanhui Lishi (委员会历史) [Committee History], ZHONGGUO
RENDA
WANG
( 中 国 人 大 网 )
[CHINA
NPC
NET],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c34456/202010/36e079db23b84378b41eecc4de257c59.shtml;
Yu Zhigang Bei Daibu (于志刚被逮捕) [Yu Zhigang Arrested], XINLANG CAIJING (新浪
财经) [SINA FINANCE] (July 15, 2021) https://finance.sina.com.cn/wm/2021-07-15/docikqciyzk5577879.shtml.
53

Han Dayuan ( 韩 大 元 ),Cong Falü Weiyuanhui Dao Xianfa He Falü
Weiyuanhui: Tizhi Yu Gongneng de Zhuanxi (从法律委员会到宪法和法律委员会：体
制与功能的转型) [From the Law Committee to the Constitution and Law Committee:
Transformation of System and Functions], HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO (华东政
法大学学报)[E. CHINA U. POL. & L. J.], no. 4 (2018), at 10.
54

Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fazhi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Jianjie (全国人大
常委会法制工作委员会简介)[Brief Introduction to the Legislative Affairs Commission
of the NPCSC], ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网)[CHINA NPC NET], Sept. 27,
2021,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/fgw001/202009/37a38fef089e499bb63b9d58ceda9ba4.shtml#
For size of the LAC staff, see Hand, supra note 14, 171 n.118 and accompanying text.
55

Brief Introduction to the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC, supra
note 54, § III(5); PRC Legislation Law, supra note 15, art. 47. While LAC responses to
legal inquiries are not formally binding, other state organs treat them as authoritative in
practice. Wang Guisong (王 贵 松), Fayuan Dui Falü Chongtu Wenti de Yingdui:
Xianzhuang Yu Qianzhan (法 院 对 法 律 冲 突 问 题 的 应 对 : 现 状 与 前 瞻) [Court
Responses to the Problem of Legislative Conflicts: The Present Situation and a Look
Forward], FASHANG YANJIU (法商研究) [L. & BUS. STUD.], no. 2, 2010, § 2(1); Dowdle,
supra note 50, at 84–85.
56

Liu Man(刘嫚)& Cheng Shuwen(程姝雯), Zheng Yanjiu Jianli Jianquan
Hexianxing Shencha Jizhi He Chengxu (正研究建立健全合宪性审查机制和程序)
[Correctly Researching the Establishment and Perfection of Constitutionality Review
Mechanisms and Procedures], NANFANG DUSHIBAO (南方都市报) [S. METR. DAILY],
(Feb. 28, 2019), available at SOHU.COM, https://www.sohu.com/a/295339501_161795.
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Official statements issued subsequent to the creation of the
Constitution and Law Committee set out a detailed agenda for pushing these
institutional reforms forward. In a 2020 publication, Xi Jinping noted
shortcomings in existing constitutional supervision mechanisms and
identified full implementation of the Constitution as the “primary task and
basic work of building rule of law.” 57 Shortly thereafter, in its Plan on
Building a Rule of Law in China (2020-2025), the Party Central Committee
devoted an entire section to constitutional law.58 Released in January 2021,
the Plan set out one of the most detailed lists of constitutional
implementation tasks that the Central Committee has published to date. It
directs the NPC and NPCSC to ensure compliance of its own laws and
regulations with the Constitution; clarify the principles, substance, and
procedures for constitutional review; establish systems for
pre-promulgation review and consultation on the constitutionality of
lower-level legislation and state measures; emphasize conflicts with the
Constitution in filing and review work; establish procedures and
mechanisms for constitutional interpretation; respond to concerns about
constitutional issues; and report on their progress.59 The prominence and
specificity of these statements signal the Party’s commitment to advance
concrete reforms.
To date, however, the Constitution and Law Committee has focused
primarily on the pre-promulgation deliberation of draft laws, decisions, and
other delegate motions. For example, immediately after the NPC adopted
the 2018 constitutional amendments and while the NPC was still in session,
the new Committee deliberated on the draft Supervision Law. 60 Chinese
scholars had questioned the constitutionality of earlier drafts of this law, and
the 2018 constitutional amendments addressed these concerns by creating a
57

Jiang Bixin(江必新)& Jiang Qinghua(蒋清华), Xi Jinping Fazhi Sixiang Zhi
Xianfa Lilun Yanjiu Lungang (习近平法治思想之宪法理论研究论纲) [Research
Outline on Constitutional Theory in Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law], ZHONGGUO
ZHENGFA DAUE XUEBAO (中国政法大学学报) [J. CHINA U. POL. SCI. & L.], Sept. 25, 2021,
§ II(2).
58

Zhonggong Zhongyang Yinfa “Fazhi Zhongguo Jianshe Guihua (2020-2025)”
(中共中央印发《法治中国建设规划(2020－2025 年)》)[Party Central Publishes the
Plan on Building a Rule of Law Government (2020-2025)], ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府)[PRC
CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVT.], Jan 1. 2021, § II.
59
60

Id. § I(5).

Di Shisanjie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xianfa He Falü Weiyuanhui
Guanyu “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jianchafa (Cao’an Xiugaigao)” Xiugai Yijian de
Baogao (第十三届全国人民代表大会宪法和法律委员会关于《中华人民共和国监察
法（草案 修改稿）》修改意见的报告) [Report on the Opinion of the 13th NPC
Constitution and Law Committee on the Revised Version of the Draft PRC Supervision
Law], Mar. 17, 2018, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC NET].
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new state organ – the State Supervision Commission. 61 The Committee
enhanced the constitutional legitimacy of this statute by declaring
unanimous support for the law, noting the 2018 amendments, and making
several modest suggestions for revision.62
Other published accounts discuss the Committee’s analysis of
constitutional questions in its review of draft legislation. For example, in
October 2018, the Committee issued a report on a draft revision of the
People’s Court Organic Law that confirmed the NPCSC’s constitutional
authority to promulgate revisions to this “basic law.”63 In another example,
the Committee assessed the question of whether the draft Foreign
Investment Law’s reference to “foreign natural persons, enterprises, or other
organizations” was consistent with Article 18 of the Constitution. 64 In a
third example in 2021, the Committee reviewed the NPC’s draft decision on
elections in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“Hong Kong
SAR”) and declared that the decision was consistent the Constitution and
Hong Kong’s Basic Law.65 Prior to 2018, the Law Committee deliberated
on some constitutional questions related to draft legislation, and such
statements are not entirely new. 66 But it is clear that strengthening
pre-promulgation review of the constitutionality of legislation will be a core
Committee function moving forward.67
61

Lin, supra note 5, at 15.

62

Report on the Opinion of the 13th NPC Constitution and Law Committee on
the Revised Version of the Draft PRC Supervision Law, supra note 60.
63

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xianfa He Falü Weiyuanhui Guanyu
“Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (Xiuding Cao’an)” Shenyi
Jieguo de Baogao (全国人民代表大会宪法和法律委员会关于《中华人民共和国人民
法院组织法（修订草案）》审议结果的报告)[NPC Constitution and Law Committee,
Report on the Results of Deliberation on the Amendment Draft of the PRC People’s Court
Organic Law], Oct. 26, 2018, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC NET],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c12435/201810/d45e0523a17449debc248c93d1a0f4d3.shtml.
64

Liu & Cheng, supra note 56.

65

Quanguo Renda Xianfa He Falü Weiyuanhui Shenyi Shegang Jueding Cao’an
Deng, Renwei Jueding Cao’an Biyao, Kexing (全国人大宪法和法律委员会审议涉港决
定 草 案 等 认 为 决 定 草 案 必 要 、 可 行 ) [NPC Constitution and Law Committee
Deliberates on Draft Decision on Hong Kong, Considers the Draft Decision to Be
Necessary and Practical], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG (中国新闻网) [CHINA NEWS NET],
Mar. 9, 2021, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2021/03-09/9428021.shtml. The decision
was controversial because it tightened central control over Hong Kong elections and
excluded “unpatriotic” opposition candidates from Hong Kong’s legislature. Sarah Zheng,
China’s NPC Approves Sweeping Changes to Hong Kong Election System, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 2021.
66

Lin and Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 472-87 (documenting numerous examples
of the Law Committee discussing constitutional issues during the legislation process).
67

Han, supra note 53, at 12. As the Vice Chair of the Committee candidly
acknowledged in late 2021, “Presently, the major work of the Committee has been the

152

Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal

[Vol. 23:2

Although the Committee has been active in reviewing draft
legislation, as of the submission of this article, progress on implementing
the Committee’s new constitutional functions has been limited. References
to new “Constitutional and Law Committee Work Rules” are one indication
of the status of implementation efforts. On its official webpage, the
Committee lists the duties set out in Article 2 of the Work Rules. The ten
specific duties listed correspond to those of the old NPC Law Committee.68
An entry following this detailed list then adds a general reference to the
Committee’s new constitutional functions and states that “the rules of
procedure for the Constitution and Law Committee to perform duties related
to the work of the Constitution shall be stipulated at another time.” 69
Similarly, annual reviews of the Committee’s operations in The People’s
Congress of China provide numerous details on the Committee’s
deliberation of draft laws and other motions. However, the reviews discuss
the Committee’s new constitutional functions only in very general and
forward-looking terms.70
Domestic scholarly discourse suggests that the Committee’s
constitutional procedures and functions are the subject of ongoing debate.
For example, the scope of the Committee’s role in the post-promulgation
review of legislation, the Committee’s procedures for interfacing with filing
unified deliberation of draft laws and paying careful attention to issues of constitutionality
in this process.” Zhu Ningning (朱宁宁), Jiaqiang He Gaijin Xin Shidai Renda Lifa
Gongzuo ( 加 强 和 改 进 新 时 代 人 大 立 法 工 作 ) [Strengthen and Improve People’s
Congress Legislative Work for the New Era], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY],
Nov. 9, 2021 (interview with Constitution and Law Committee Vice Chair Zhou
Guangquan).
68

Weiyuanhui Zhize (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Xianfa Yu Falü
Weiyuanhui Gongzuo Guize Di Er Tiao)(委员会职责（全国人民代表大会宪法和法律
委 员 会 工 作 规 则 第 二 条 ））[Committee Responsibilities (Constitution and Law
Committee Work Rules Article 2)], Oct. 19, 2020, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大
网
)[CHINA
NPC
NET],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c34457/202010/6cd46be8404e41e587e77273ba9be272.shtml
(noting that to date, the full text of the Constitution and Law Committee Work Rules
referenced in this post has not been publicly released).
69
70

Id.

See Li Fei(李飞),Wei Tuijin Guojia Zhili Tixi He Zhili Nengli Xiandaihua
Tigong Youli Fazhi Baozhang (为推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化提供有力法治
保障) [Provide a Strong Rule of Law Guarantee to Advance the Modernization of the State
Governance System and Governance Capacity], ZHONGGUO RENDA(中国人大) [THE
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF CHINA], May 5, 2020, 13-16; Zhang Weiwei( 张 维 炜 )& Li
Qianwen( 李 倩 文 ), Dili Fenjin Yong Dandang–Quanguo Renda Xianfa He Falü
Weiyuanhui 2020 Nian Gongzuo Huimou (砥砺奋进勇担当——全国人大宪法和法律委
员会 2020 年工作回眸) [Retrospective on the Work of the Constitution and Law
Committee in 2020], ZHONGGUO RENDA (中国人大)[THE PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF CHINA],
Mar. 5, 2021, 15-18.
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and review organs, and the Committee’s status with respect to those organs
are unclear. Scholarly commentary suggests a possible division of labor,
with questions on the constitutionality of legislation being certified to the
Committee, while the existing LAC Filing and Review Office focuses on
reviewing the “legality” of legislation.71 Review of the constitutionality of
legislation may require interpretation of the Constitution’s abstract
provisions, so the Committee must also develop standards and procedures
for coordinating constitutional interpretations.72 A team of scholars led by
Han Dayuan completed an expert draft of a “Constitutional Interpretation
Procedure Law” in 2015.73 While this draft may provide a foundation for
developing constitutional interpretation practices, procedural and
jurisdictional questions need to be addressed to account for the new
Committee’s role in interpretation.74
Indeed, when it comes to specifics on how the Committee will
implement its new constitutional functions, Chinese scholars continue to
raise many questions. At a Chinese Law Society meeting on the Constitution
and Law Committee in 2020, leading constitutional law scholars identified
numerous unresolved issues. 75 Similarly, in a long scholarly exposition,
71

Hu Jinguang(胡锦光), Lun Woguo Hexianxing Shencha Jizhizhong Butong
Zhuti de Zhineng Dingwei (论我国合宪性审查机制中不同主体的职能定位) [On the
Status and Function of Different Entities in the My Country’s Constitutionality Review
System], FAXUE JIA (法学家) [THE JURIST], no. 5, 2020, at 80-81.
72

Zhu Ningning(朱宁宁), Zhongguo Fazhi Buru Hexianxing Shencha Shidai
( 中 国 法 治 步 入 合 宪 性 审 查 时 代 ) [China’s Rule of Law Steps into an Age of
Constitutionality Review], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY], Feb. 26, 2019,
ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG ( 中 国 人 大 网 ) [CHINA NPC NET], FEB. 26, 2019,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c723/201902/afbb32fd3303446aa865725500b7807e.shtml.
73

Fan, supra note 10, at 21. For the expert draft, see Han Dayuan（韩大元）,
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa Jieshi Chengxufa (Zhuanjia Jianyi Gao) Ji Qi
Shuoming (《中华人民共和国宪法解释程序法（专家建议稿）》及其说明)[PRC
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law (Expert Draft for Proposal) and its
Explanation], Nov. 21, 2015, ZHONGGUO XIANZHENG WANG (中国宪政网) [CHINA
CONSTITUTIONALISM NET], http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=10166.
74

Han Dayuan(韩大元), Xi Jinping Fazhi Sixiang Zhong Youguan Xianfa Jieshi
Zhidu de Lunshu (习近平法治思想中有关宪法解释制度的论述) [Discussion Related
to Constitutional Interpretation Systems in Xi Jinping Rule of Law Thought], FAXUE
LUNTAN (法学论坛)[LEGAL FORUM], no. 3, 2021, at 5 (citing concrete issues such as the
division of labor between the NPCSC “interpreting the Constitution” and the Constitution
and Law Committee “developing constitutional interpretation”; the entities that can raise
constitutional interpretation proposals; the procedural relationship between active and
passive interpretation; and the role of the SPC).
75

Zhongguo Faxuehui Xianfaxue Yanjiuhui Renda Zhidu Yanjiu Zhuanye
Weiyuanhui 2020 Nian Nianhui Chenggong Juban (中国法学会宪法学研究会人大制度
研究专业委员会 2020 年年会成功举办) [The Chinese Law Society Constitutional
Research Association’s Special Committee on People's Congress System Research 2020
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Constitution and Law Committee member Jiang Bixin and co-author Jiang
Qinghua discuss Xi Jinping’s constitutional theory in intricate detail, but
they emphasize a need to “clarify” specific provisions on the duties and
procedures of the Committee and raise concrete issues related to
constitutional supervision that still must be resolved.76
The operation of the LAC reinforces perceptions that the
Committee’s constitutional functions are a work in progress and suggests
that jurisdictional tensions on constitutional issues may be emerging.
Domestic publications have focused primarily on the Constitution Office’s
support for Committee deliberations on draft legislation, rather than on
concrete efforts to develop the Committee’s expanded constitutional
functions.77 While the Legislation Law provides that the LAC’s function is
to research draft legislation and compile comments on such drafts, in
practice an overwhelmed Committee has delegated some of the work of
assessing draft legislation to the Constitution Office. 78 Perhaps more
importantly, the LAC still does most of the work to review legislation after

Annual Meeting Conducted Successfully], HUAZHONG KEJI DAXUE FAXUEYUAN(华中科
技 大 学 法 学 院 ) [HUAZHONG U. OF SC. & TECH. L. SCH.], Nov. 6, 2020.
http://law.hust.edu.cn/info/1051/3184.htm.
76

Jiang & Jiang Q., supra note 57, § 3(3).

77

See, e.g., Wang Yijun(王亦君)& Liu Shixin(刘世昕), Zuigao Guojia Quanli
Jiguan “Xin Chengyuan” Lüxin Yinian Jiao Dajuan (最高国家权力机关“新成员”履
新一年交答卷) [The “New Member” of the Highest Organ of State Power Transmits its
Record after Assuming its Post for a Year], ZHONGGUO QINGNIANBAO( 中 国 青 年
报)[CHINA YOUTH DAILY], Mar. 14, 2019, ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN ZAI XIAN (中国青年在
线
)[CHINA
YOUTH
ONLINE],
http://zqb.cyol.com/html/201903/14/nw.D110000zgqnb_20190314_1-04.htm (explaining that the Constitution Office
coordinated with the Committee as it deliberated on draft laws and draft amendments to
laws, including the People’s Court Organic Law, the People’s Procuratorate Organic Law,
the Martyrs Protection Law, the Criminal Procedure Law, and the Foreign Investment
Law); Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fagongwei Deng Juban Xianfa Lishi Wenxian
Ziliaozhan(全国人大常委会法工委等举办宪法历史文献资料展) [NPCSC LAC Holds
Document Exhibition on Constitutional History], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG (中国新闻
网 )[CHINA NEWS NET], Dec. 4, 2020, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2020/1204/9354445.shtml.
78

PRC Legislation Law, supra note 15, arts. 38, 39; Changhao Wei & Taige Hu,
The NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission and its Invisible Legislators, NPC OBSERVER,
(June 21, 2021), https://npcobserver.com/2018/06/25/scholarship-highlight-the-npcsclegislative-affairs-commission-and-its-invisible-legislators/ (noting that with limited
personnel and staff support, the Constitution and Law Committee has delegated to the
Constitution Office work such as filtering comments on draft legislation and suggesting
amendments on the basis of those comments).
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it has been promulgated.79 And, LAC staff continue to opine publicly on
constitutional questions related to legislation.80
Public LAC commentary on constitutional questions could diminish
the authority of the Constitution and Law Committee. Legal scholar Hu
Jinguang argues that in the wake of the 2018 constitutional amendments and
related institutional reforms, the LAC should refrain from constitutional
review work.81 However, procedures on filing and review promulgated in
2019 left this jurisdictional issue unsettled, providing only generally that
when constitutional issues arise in the review of legislation, the
“Constitution and Law Committee and the LAC shall actively conduct
constitutional review” and “raise written review and research opinions.”82
These dynamics have prompted some Chinese scholars to question whether
the new Committee has the capacity to perform its constitutional functions
and to express concern that the Committee has already been marginalized.83
79

Chinese Law Society Constitutional Research Association’s Special Committee
on People’s Congress System Research 2020 Annual Meeting Conducted Successfully,
supra note 75 (Comments of Shanghai Jiaotong University Law School Professor Fan
Jinxue).
80

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo
Weiyuanhui Guanyu 2020 Nian Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Qingkuang de Baogao (全国人
民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员会关于 2020 年备案审查工作情况的报告)
[NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission, Report on the Situation of Filing and Review
Work in 2020], Jan. 20, 2021, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网)[CHINA NPC NET],
[hereinafter 2020 Filing and Review Work Report], § IV(1). In August 2021, the Legal
Daily published a detailed explanation of the constitutionality of an NPCSC decision that
authorized the Shanghai People’s Congress to adopt regulations for its Pudong New
District. Quanguo Renda Fagongwei Xianfashi Jiedu “Pudong Xinqu Fagui” (全国人大
法工委宪法室解读“浦东新区法规”) [NPC LAC Constitution Office Deciphers
“Pudong New District Regulation”], SHANGHAI RENDA WANG (上海人大网) [SHANGHAI
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS NET], Aug. 6, 2021, FAZHI WANG(法治网)[LEGAL DAILY ONLINE]
http://m.legaldaily.com.cn/rdlf/content/2021-08/06/content_8574328.htm.
81

Hu, supra note 71, at 80 (arguing the scope of the LAC’s work on constitutional
issues should change after the 2018 constitutional amendments and related reforms).
82

Fagui, Sifa Jieshi Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Banfa (法规,司法解释备案审查
工 作 办 法 )[Work Measures on Filing and Review of Regulations and Judicial
Interpretations], adopted by the 44tth Chairman’s Meeting of the 13th NPCSC, Dec. 16,
2019, art. 20, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC NET] [hereinafter
2019
Work
Measures
on
Filing
and
Review],
http://www.njrd.gov.cn/gfxwjbasc_0/flfgzd_66723/202103/t20210302_2835520.html.
83

Wang Kai observes that because most Committee members hold concurrent
posts, the Committee does not meet frequently and has not realized the roles initially
envisioned for it. Zhiming Xianfa Xuezhe Wang Kai Jiaoshou Zhujiang Hexianxing
Shencha de Zhongguo Shijian (知名宪法学者王锴教授主讲“合宪性审查的中国实
践”) [Famous Constitutional Law Scholar Professor Wang Kai Lectures on China’s
Practice of Constitutionality Review], NANKAI DAXUE FAXUEYUAN WANGZHAN (南开大
学法学院网站) [NANKAI U. L. SCH. WEBSITE], Nov. 23, 2020. Fan Jinxue goes further and
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C. New Transparency and Capacity in the Filing and Review
System
In addition to the creation of the Constitution and Law Committee,
there have been several notable developments related to constitutional
supervision at lower levels of the NPC system. NPC officials characterize
the system for filing and review of legislation as a “focal point” for
perfecting constitutional supervision and a “foundation for promoting
constitutional review work.”84 Since 2017, the NPCSC and the LAC have
taken steps to address transparency deficits in the system, standardize the
filing and review process, and encourage citizens to participate in the
process of identifying legislation that conflicts with the Constitution
and law.85
The LAC opened a new, more transparent stage in its filing and
review work when it began publishing annual reports on the system in 2017.
The work reports provide insights into the objectives, scale, and complexity
of filing and review efforts. The initial 2017 report included comprehensive
statistics on legislation filed with the NPCSC for review from 2013 to 2017
(4,778 pieces of legislation), the number of citizen proposals for review of
legislation over the same period (1,527 citizen proposals), and the number
of problematic regulations and judicial interpretations repealed (200 since
2004). It also identified correcting Supreme People’s Court and Supreme
People’s Procuratorate (SPP) judicial interpretations as a focus of recent
work.86 Subsequent reports have updated these statistics on an annual basis,
described special areas of focus for filing and review work each year, and
documented efforts to provide feedback to citizens on their proposals for
the review of legislation.87
asserts that the Committee has already been marginalized. Special Committee on People’s
Congress System Research 2020 Annual Meeting Conducted Successfully, supra note 75;
see also Wei & Hu, supra note 78, (noting organizational capacity problems).
84

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo
Weiyuanhui Guanyu Shi’er Jie Quanguo Renda Yilai Ji 2017 Nian Bei’an Shencha
Gongzuo Qingkuang de Baogao (全国人民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员会关于
十二届全国人大以来暨 2017 年备案审查工作情况的报告) [NPCSC Legislative Affairs
Commission, Report on the Situation of Filing and Review Work in since the 12th NPC and
in 2017], Dec. 24, 2017, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC NET]
[hereinafter
2017
Filing
and
Review
Work
Report],
§§
1,
4
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2017-12/27/content_2035723.htm.
85

For an excellent overview of recent developments in the filing and review
system, see Changhao Wei, Reining in Rogue Legislation, MADE IN CHINA J., vol. 6, no. 2
(Sept. 2021), 48-55.
86
87

2017 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 84, § 1.

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo
Weiyuanhui Guanyu 2018 Nian Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Qingkuang de Baogao(全国人
民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员会关于 2018 年备案审查工作情况的报
告)[NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission, Report on the Situation of Filing and Review
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The work reports also provide brief descriptions of citizen review
proposals, specific legislation the LAC has reviewed, and related outcomes.
Many of the citizen proposals described in the reports appear to be
politically anodyne. Examples include challenges to rules and regulations
on famous trademark registration, joint spousal responsibility for debts
following divorce, road and traffic management, fees for parking violations,
grassland restoration fees, and the illegal practice of medicine. The work
reports typically provide a brief description of the issue, indicate that the
Filing and Review Office consulted with the promulgating organ, and note
progress in conforming the challenged provisions to higher-level legislation.
Several reports feature descriptions of LAC work on potentially
sensitive issues. For example, one citizen review proposal argued that an
SPP interpretation effectively reduced the Criminal Procedure Law’s
evidentiary standard for formal arrest by authorizing procuratorates to
approve the “conditional arrest” of suspects in major cases on the basis of
incomplete evidence.88 The report states that LAC officials conferred with
the SPP and that procuratorates are no longer implementing this provision.89
In another example, the 2018 and 2019 work reports describe
proposals for the review of State Council legislation on “custody and
education,” a controversial system of administrative detention for
prostitutes and their clients. After referencing the formal abolition of
China’s re-education through labor system in 2013, the 2018 report
describes LAC efforts to build consensus on the custody and education issue
and its recommendation that the relevant regulations be repealed. 90 The
2019 report documents steps to repeal the system. 91 When the NPCSC
Work in 2018], ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC NET] [hereinafter
2018
Filing
and
Review
Work
Report],
§
1,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c12491/201812/afbfcb16af1d455b86dfb0cb4175ba2a.shtml;
2020 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 80, § 4(1).
88

Wang Mengyao (王梦遥), 11 Nian Lai, Beishou Zhengyi Zuigaojian Yaoqiu
Tingyong ‘Futiaojian Daibu’ Guiding, (11 年来备受争议 最高检要求停用“附条件逮
捕”规定) [After 11 Years of Controversy, the SPP Suspends Application of Provisions on
"Conditional Arrest"], XINJING BAO (新京报) [BEIJING NEWS], July 7, 2017, ZHONGGUO
XINWEN
WANG
(中
国
新
闻
网)
[CHINA
NEWS
NET],
https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2017/07-15/8278411.shtml.
89

2017 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 84, § II(2).

90

2018 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 87, § II(2).

91

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo
Weiyuanhui Guanyu 2019 Nian Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Qingkuang de Baogao (全国人
民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员会关于 2019 年备案审查工作情况的报告)
[NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission, Report on the Situation of Filing and Review
Work in 2019], Dec. 25, 2019, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC NET]
[hereinafter
2019
Filing
and
Review
Work
Report],
§
II(3),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201912/24cac1938ec44552b285f0708f78c944.shtml.
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formally repealed the custody and education system a year later, it did not
cite a constitutional rationale for doing so.92 Nevertheless, the willingness
of the LAC to publicize its recommendation, and to comment on a review
proposal with constitutional implications, marked a break from past
practice.93
In a further sign of this shift, the 2020 work report contains a special
section describing the LAC’s work to “reliably resolve constitutional issues.”
It cites several concrete examples. In one, the LAC concluded that a fee
imposed on air passengers for China’s civil aviation development fund is
constitutional (but lacks a lawful basis after the amendment of the Budget
Law in 2014).94
The LAC has also addressed several longstanding issues related to
equal protection and discrimination in China. In its 2020 work report, the
LAC publicized a suggestion that the SPC amend a controversial 2003
judicial interpretation that has the effect of creating different compensation
standards for urban and rural residents in personal injury cases.95 Since the
mid-2000s, Chinese citizens have repeatedly challenged the
constitutionality of this interpretation, arguing that it violates the equal
protection clause (Article 33) of the Constitution.96 Although the LAC did
not address these constitutional arguments directly, it concluded that in the
wake of social and governance changes in China, the different standards
should be abolished.97
In its 2021 Work Report, the LAC also addressed a conflict in
92

Quanguo Renda Changweihui Tongguo Feizhi Youguan Shourong Jiaoyu Falü
Guiding He Zhidu de Jueding (全国人大常委会通过废止有关收容教育法律规定和制
度的决定) [NPCSC Decision to Abolish the Custody and Education Regulations and
System], Dec. 28, 2019, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC NET],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201912/0aaecba8d5c84ba4a9e4484ee8dc12fb.shtml.
93
Wei, supra note 85, at 49 (observing that constitutional arguments raised to
challenge the custody and education system in 2018 were very similar to the arguments
Chinese scholars advanced to challenge the custody and repatriation system in 2003, but
that NPC entities were careful to not to publicly comment on the constitutionality of
custody and repatriation in 2003).
94

2020 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 80, § 4.

95

Id.

96

For a discussion of early challenges, see Keith J. Hand, Citizens Engage the
Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review Proposals in the
People’s Republic of China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 238-39
(Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2009).
97

For a thoughtful discussion of the LAC’s statement in the context of recent
reform dynamics, see Dongyu Sun, “Same Life, Different Values:” An Example of How
Judicial Interpretations are Reviewed in China, Apr. 16, 2021 (Susan Finder & Changhao
Wei
eds.)
SUPREME
PEOPLE’S
COURT
MONITOR
https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2021/04/16/same-life-different-values-anexample-of-how-judicial-interpretations-are-reviewed-in-china/.
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national law and administrative regulations on the issue of whether a premarital health examination certificate is required to register a marriage. As
early as 2005, Chinese citizens sent proposals to the NPCSC requesting
review of legislative conflicts on pre-marital health exams.98 This has long
been an issue of concern, in part because Hepatitis B virus carriers in China
experience discrimination in marriage, employment, education, and other
endeavors.99 The LAC finally addressed the conflict in 2021. It concluded
that while China’s new Civil Code establishes a legal duty to notify partners
of major infections prior to marriage, and partners may annul a marriage for
breach of this disclosure duty, the Code does not prohibit marriage when a
party suffers from such infections. The LAC recommended the revision of
conflicting laws and regulations “in accordance with the spirit of the
Civil Code.”100
The work reports also illustrate ways in which the filing and review
process may operate to narrow or redefine rights. In 2020, the LAC found
that several local regulations governing the use of local languages in ethnic
minority schools violate Article 19 of the Constitution, which requires the
state to promote Mandarin nationwide.101 The LAC revisited this issue in
2021, stating conclusively that all regions, including ethnic minority areas,
must fully implement “national language education” and correct conflicting
local regulations. 102 This finding reinforces the central government’s
assimilation campaigns in autonomous regions such as Xinjiang and

98

Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Citizens Petition NPC
Standing Committee Review of Conflicting Legal Provisions on Marriage Registration,
Aug. 31, 2005. Citizens filed a similar review proposal in 2021. Wo Yuan Shisheng Tichu
de Bei’an Shencha Jianyi Huode Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fagongwei Zhongshi Bing
Ruxuan 2021 Niandu Quanguo Shida Xianfa Shili (我院师生提出的备案审查建议获全
国人大常委会法工委重视并入选 2021 年度全国十大宪法事例) [Filing and Review
Proposal of Our Law School’s Teachers and Students Receives the Close Attention of the
NPC Legislative Affairs Commission and Is Selected as One of the Ten Major
Constitutional Precedents of 2021], WANG JIAN FAXUEYUAN [KENNETH WANG LAW
SCHOOL WEBSITE], Jan. 5, 2022, http://law.suda.edu.cn/58/34/c1054a481332/page.htm.
99

Voices Against Discrimination: Chinese Citizens Challenge Discriminatory
Regulations and Practices, CHINA L. & GOV. REV. (June 2004) (on file with author).
100

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Fazhi Gongzuo
Weiyuanhui Guanyu 2021 Nian Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Qingkuang De Baogao (全国人
民代表大会常务委员会法制工作委员会关于 2021 年备案审查工作情况的报告)
[NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission, Report on the Situation of Filing and Review
Work in 2021], Dec. 21, 2021, ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中国人大网) [CHINA NPC NET]
[hereinafter
2021
Filing
and
Review
Work
Report],
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202112/2606f90a45b1406e9e57ff45b42ceb1c.shtml.
101

2020 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 80, § 4. See Wei, supra note
85, at 52-53 for a discussion of these constitutional findings.
102

2021 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 100, § 2.
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Tibet.103 The 2021 work report also identifies the filing and review of local
laws in Hong Kong and Macau, and maintenance of the “constitutional
order” and “rule of law” in special administrative regions, as a focus for
2022. Such references raise the possibility that the filing and review process
could be used to support the central government’s ongoing efforts to tighten
control over Hong Kong.104
To strengthen the filing and review system, the NPCSC Chairman’s
Meeting publicly promulgated new filing and review procedures in late
2019. The Work Measures on Filing and Review of Regulations and Judicial
Interpretations (“Work Measures”) are expansive in scope, with 57 articles
setting out general principles for filing and review work and specifying the
scope and procedures for filing and review, the entities responsible for filing
and review, and standards for the review of legislation. 105 The Work
Measures provide for the electronic filing of new legislation; 106 require
reviewing organs to provide feedback both to state organs and citizens on
the disposition of the review proposals; 107 and mandate that the LAC
publish annual reports to the NPCSC on filing and review work. 108
Contemporaneous with the release of the Work Measures, the NPCSC
established a new online platform that citizens could use to submit and track
proposals for the review of legislation.109 The LAC has also established an
expert committee to provide advice on filing and review issues. 110 Such
steps are consistent with broader efforts in the political-legal system to
enhance technological resources and tap citizen expertise.111
103
Peh Hong Lim, China Steps Up Assimilation of Ethnic Minorities by Banning
Languages
in
Schools,
VOICE
OF
AMERICA
(Oct.
24,
2021),
https://www.voanews.com/a/china-steps-up-assimilation-of-ethnic-minorities-bybanning-languages-in-schools-/6281558.html.
104
For recent developments in Hong Kong, see Michael C. Davis, Hong Kong:
How Beijing Perfected Repression, 33 J. OF DEMOCRACY 100, 100 (2022).
105

See generally 2019 Work Measures on Filing and Review, supra note 82
(reporting that the Work Measures left some issues, such as the division of labor between
the Constitution and Law Committee and the LAC, to be sorted out in day-to-day practice);
Id., arts. 20, 21, 33, 40 (assigning review functions to both special committees and the
LAC). Indeed, Article 33 provides that if special committees and the LAC determine that
it is necessary to conduct a joint review, they may hold a “joint review meeting” and, if
they reach different conclusions, should report the results to the NPCSC Chairman’s
Meeting. Id. art. 33.
106

Id. arts. 6, 12.

107

Id. arts. 48-51.

108

Id. arts. 52-53.

109

Wei, supra note 85, at 51.

110

2021 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 100, § 4.
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Official statistics suggest that the work reports and institutional
reforms have re-invigorated public interest in the filing and review system.
Following publication of its inaugural work report in December 2017, the
LAC reported receiving a staggering 4,578 citizen letters and review
proposals in 2018 (almost three times the total for the prior six years
combined) and noted that filing and review organs sent responses to some
citizens.112 Citizens have continued to engage the system, with the LAC
reporting receipt of 5,146 review proposals in 2020 and 6,339 review
proposals in 2021 (including 5,065 review proposals filed through the
LAC’s new online platform). 113 Prior to 2017, filing and review organs
conducted their work in an opaque manner out of concern that publicity
could trigger a flood of sensitive citizen review proposals. 114 New
transparency in the filing and review system and the robust citizen response
signal a shift in this official calculus.
IV.

ASSESSING CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION REFORMS

The lack of attention outside of China to the Constitution and Law
Committee suggests that foreign observers disregarded it as a superficial
reform. But the creation of the Committee involves more than meets the eye.
The NPCSC’s decisions to expand the Committee’s constitutional functions,
establish the NPCSC LAC Constitution Office, and reform the filing and
review system demonstrate that there is substance behind the name change.
The reconstituted Committee has operated for only a short period
interrupted by the COVID crisis, and it has yet to publish detailed
procedures for implementing its new constitutional functions. Consequently,
this assessment must acknowledge that the Committee and related reforms
are a work in progress. December 2022 marks the 40th anniversary of the
1982 Constitution and may present an opportune moment for NPC entities
to demonstrate further progress on constitutional supervision.
China’s current political environment adds to the challenge of
https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2020/05/04/supreme-peoples-courts-newvision-for-the-chinese-courts/ (discussing ways in which the SPC’s directives “New Era
governance” emphasize Party leadership, judicial discipline, and online platforms).
112

2018 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 87, § 1; 2020 Filing and
Review Work Report, supra note 80, § 3.
113
2020 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 80, § 3; 2021 Filing and
Review Work Report, supra note 100, § 2. The LAC reported receiving only 138 citizen
review proposals in 2019, but it did not state a reason for the significantly smaller number.
2019 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 91, § 2.
114

Hu Jinguang(胡锦光), Lun Sheli “Xianfa He Falü Weiyuanhui de Yiyi (论设
立“宪法和法律委员会”的意义) [Discussing the Significance of the Constitution and
Law Committee], ZHENGFA LUNCONG (政法丛)[COMMENTARY ON POLITICS AND LAW], at
5, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE WANG (中 国 社 会 科 学 网) [CHINA SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH NET] (July 6, 2018), http://www.cssn.cn/fx/201807/t20180706_4497495.shtml.
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assessing the Committee’s likely impact. Domestic legal scholarship often
provides a useful resource for assessing such reforms, but it is clear that the
Party-state limited public discussion of the 2018 constitutional
amendments.115 The suspension of Qinghua Professor Xu Zhangrun and the
removal of Professor Zhang Qianfan’s popular constitutional law textbook
from bookstores in 2019 demonstrate the pressures constitutional law
scholars face.116 While Chinese scholars have published numerous articles
on the Constitution and Law Committee and related issues, the domestic
Chinese literature must be read with appreciation for the sensitivity of the
subject matter and the reality that scholars with critical views of China’s
constitutional system cannot publish freely.
A. Limited Prospects for Enhanced Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights
With these caveats in mind, it is doubtful the Constitution and Law
Committee will have much significance for the enforcement of fundamental
rights in China. China’s leaders had a range of socialist models to draw on
for a specialized constitutional supervision organ. Some, such as the
Hungarian Constitutional Council and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal,
exercised a mix of advisory and binding powers to review legislation.117
The record of authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the socialist world and
East Asia suggests that even with more robust powers on paper, a
constitutional committee would not be likely to apply fundamental rights
expansively or otherwise challenge Party power. 118 Nevertheless, in the
Constitution and Law Committee, China’s leaders chose the weakest of the
socialist models – a committee of parliamentary deputies, subordinate to the
supreme legislature, with only advisory functions. Furthermore, as
discussed below, they did so only after taking steps to contain citizen
115

Lin, supra note 5, at 11-12; China Censors in Overdrive over Possible
Constitution Amendment, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF JOURNALISTS, Feb. 28, 2018,
https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/press-releases/article/chinacensors-in-overdrive-over-possible-constitution-amendment.html; Charlotte Gao, The
CCP’s Proposed Term Limit Change Shocks China, THE DIPLOMAT, Feb. 26, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-ccps-proposed-term-limit-change-shocks-china/.
116

Xi Wang et al., China Censors Law Textbook Over ‘Western’ Influences, RADIO
FREE ASIA, Feb. 4, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/textbook02042019114215.html; Chris Buckley, A Chinese Law Professor Criticized Xi. Now He’s
Been Suspended, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2019.
117

Klaus-Jurgen Kuss, New Institutions in Socialist Constitutional Law: The
Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Hungarian Constitutional Council, 12 REV.
SOCIALIST L. 343, 353-66 (1986).
118

For the limited impact of constitutional supervision organs in Eastern Europe,
see Mark F. Brzezinski, The Emergence of Judicial Review in Eastern Europe: The Case
of Poland, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 153-200 (1993). For constitutional courts under authoritarian
governments in East Asia, see generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003).
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constitutional argument. Romania created a similar committee in 1965, and
its impact on rights enforcement was negligible. 119 Perhaps with such
limitations in mind, even generally supportive Chinese commentators
displayed flashes of ambivalence toward the Committee, characterizing it
as a “low cost” or “compromise” step, or acknowledging “a certain gap”
between the new committee and “the independent constitutional committee
that the scholarly world has continuously promoted.”120
The experience of the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee (“BLC”)
is instructive here. In 1990, the NPC issued a decision to establish the BLC
when Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, came into effect seven
years later.121 The Basic Law provides that the NPCSC is obliged to consult
the BLC on a range of matters, including interpretation and amendment of
the Basic Law and decisions to invalidate Hong Kong ordinances that
conflict with the Basic Law.122 As Eric Ip argues, the BLC had the potential
to play a significant role in interpreting the Basic Law and arbitrating
constitutional tensions between the central government and the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region. It could have been a model for a future
constitutional supervision committee on the mainland.123 Instead, although
the BLC exercises only advisory functions and the central government
controls its membership, the BLC suffers from significant transparency
deficits, and its role and influence are limited in practice.124 The central
government has deployed a variety of legal tools, including NPCSC
interpretations of the Basic Law and legislation such as the Hong Kong
119

Leszek Garlicki, Constitutional Developments in Poland, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L. J.
713, 716 (1988).
120

Han, supra note 53, at 6; Wang, supra note 7.

121

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Pizhun Xianggang Tebie
Xingzhengqu Jibenfa Qicao Weiyuanhui Guanyu Sheli Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui
Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu Jibenfa Weiyuanhui de Jianyi de Jueding (全国人民代表
大会关于批准香港特别行政区基本法起草委员会关于设立全国人民代表大会常务委
员会香港特别行政区基本法委员会的建议的决定) [Decision of the NPC Approving the
Proposal by the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region on the Establishment of the Committee for the Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the NPCSC], issued Apr. 4, 1990, art. 2,
ZHONGGUO RENDA WANG (中 国 人 大 网) [CHINA NPC NET],
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cohk/chn/syzx/tyflsw/t54819.htm.
122
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, adopted by the
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, April 4, 1990, arts. 17(3),
18(3), 158(4), 159(3).
123
See Eric C. Ip, Prototype Constitutional Supervision in China: The Lessons of
the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee, 10 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 323-42 (2016).
124

Id. at 339-41. See also Yash Ghai, The Political Economy of Interpretation, in
INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR COHERENCE, 115-42
(Hualing Fu et. al, eds. 2007) (arguing that the Basic Law Committee has been “co-opted
and subordinated to the Central Authorities”).
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National Security Law, to tighten its grip on Hong Kong and narrow the
scope of civil and political rights there.125 The appointment of Li Fei, who
served as Vice Director and then Director of the BLC over a ten-year period
from 2008 to 2018, suggests that Chinese leaders could have a similar,
marginal role in mind for the Constitution and Law Committee.
Assessing the Committee against the backdrop of other 2018
constitutional amendments brings the limited nature of the reform into
sharper relief. One obstacle to a constitutional supervision committee with
more expansive powers is that the creation of such a body would require a
realignment of China’s constitutional structure. It is notable that the NPC
did undertake a constitutional restructuring of such magnitude in 2018 when
it created a new state organ – the State Supervision Commission.126 The fact
that the NPC took such a step to constitutionalize and expand the powers of
China’s disciplinary apparatus, rather than to create a robust constitutional
supervision mechanism, highlights the limited nature of the Constitution
and Law Committee reform. The omission of the amendment creating the
Constitution and Law Committee in the Party’s 2018 constitutional
amendment proposal is further evidence that it was a low priority. Some
scholars, noting a lack of transparency and irregularities in the amendment
approval process, have speculated that there may have been resistance to
the amendments within the Party.127 It is possible that the Committee was
added as a late concession to generate support for the amendment package.
B. Efforts to Rationalize China’s Constitutional System
If the Committee’s impact in enforcing constitutional rights is likely
to be limited, why proceed with the reform at all? Many of the 2018
amendments can be understood as components of a broad constitutional
rationalization intended to eliminate gaps (perceived or actual) between the
text of the Constitution and Party-state practice. For example, the 2015
Legislation Law amendment authorized cities with districts to promulgate
local regulations.128 However, the Constitution did not explicitly grant cities
125

Ghai, supra note 124, at 127-28, 138 (observing that central authorities needed
a “legal” and “reasonable” method to control Hong Kong and turned to NPCSC
interpretation as one key method); Davis, supra note 104 (discussing the legal and political
tools the central government has deployed to “replace the liberal constitutional order
promised in the Basic Law with what is effectively a national security constitution”).
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Lin, supra note 5, at 11-12, 16.
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Zhang & Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 356.
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Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Lifafa” de Jueding (全国人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共和国立法
法》的决定) [National People’s Congress, Decision to Amend the PRC Legislation Law],
adopted Mar. 15, 2015, arts. 31-36, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO QUANGUO RENMIN
DAIBIAO DAHUI (中 华 人 民 共 和 国 全 国 人 民 代 表 大 会) [NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.],
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-03/18/content_2834713.htm.
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such legislative authority. As noted in Section III(3), scholars had
questioned the constitutionality of existing anti-corruption practices and
early drafts of the PRC Supervision Law. The 2018 constitutional
amendments provided a constitutional basis for these systems. 129 The
amendment eliminating term limits for the state presidency provides a third
example. The role of the state president is largely ceremonial. Even if Xi
relinquished the state presidency, he could maintain a firm grip on China’s
political system as head of the Party and the Central Military
Commission.130 The amendment paves the way for Xi to retain all three of
the top Party-state posts, thus mitigating the awkwardness of having another
leader serve as ceremonial head of state in meetings with foreign leaders.
The Constitution and Law Committee can be viewed as part of this
rationalization effort. The Party-state’s commitment to “rule according to
law” is a pillar of its governing legitimacy. Gaps between the leadership’s
reform rhetoric and the text of the Constitution, on the one hand, and
Party-state practice, on the other, weaken the power of this legitimizing
narrative. Chinese leaders regularly emphasize the Constitution as
fundamental law and promote the narrative of a unified socialist legal
system. Chinese citizens have pressed for a specialized constitutional
supervision organ for decades, and the Party-state has made explicit
commitments in this regard. Because the leadership’s rhetorical
commitments to the Constitution make such citizen demands difficult to
ignore, the Constitution can become what some scholars have characterized
as a regime “irritant.”131 By creating the Constitution and Law Committee
and demonstrating that the filing and review system is functioning, senior
leaders can argue that they are fulfilling their commitments to strengthen
constitutional supervision and reap corresponding legitimacy dividends.
The operation of the Constitution and Law Committee in turn
bolsters the legitimacy of other state acts. The Committee’s heavy emphasis
on pre-promulgation review of draft legislation highlights this function.
Committee review of legislative proposals may identify constitutional
tensions that drafters did not recognize, allowing such tensions to be
resolved prior to promulgation. 132 Perhaps more importantly, when
proposed legislation generates constitutional controversy, central leaders
129

Amendment to the PRC Constitution, supra note 47, art. 47.

130

Lin, supra note 5, at 14.

131

Chang & Law, supra note 32, at 510-11.
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Legal scholars argue that assessing legislative conflicts prior to promulgation
is preferable, as it avoids the tensions and complexity of the post-promulgation review
process. Liu Songshan (刘松山), Difang Renda Ji Qi Changweihui Baozheng Xianfa Shishi
de Diwei He Zuoyong (地方人大及其常委会保证宪法实施的地位和作用) [The Status
and Functions of Local People’s Congresses and their Standing Committees in Ensuring
Implementation of the Constitution], FAXUE LUNTAN (法学论坛) [LEGAL FORUM], no. 3,
2009, at 89.
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can quell such debates by noting that China’s new constitutional committee
has reviewed the legislation and resolved the issue. The Committee’s
endorsement of the constitutionality of the PRC Supervision Law and the
NPC’s 2021 decision on Hong Kong’s electoral system are examples of this
dynamic.133 Even if the Committee’s review and declarations of support are
largely a formality, the operation of this specialized constitutional organ
reinforces the narrative of constitutional supremacy.134
Consistent with this narrative, China’s leaders may depart from the
practice of experimenting with some reforms that technically violate the
Constitution. This practice has prompted scholarly debate about the
propriety of so-called “benign violations” of the Constitution.135 In a recent
media discussion of Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law, one constitutional
law scholar notes the phenomenon and argues that future reforms will be
carried out strictly in accordance with the Constitution.136 In an example of
this shift, discussion of an NPCSC decision authorizing the Shanghai
municipality to issue legislation for its Pudong district emphasized the
constitutionality of the decision and contrasted it with the NPC’s
authorization of China’s Special Economic Zones in the 1980s. 137 If
maintaining the form of compliance with the Constitution is a core
component of Xi’s legal theory, even benign violations in the service of
reform are problematic. To the extent existing constitutional provisions are
unclear, constitutional interpretation, another key component of the
133

The Committee can be expected to confer constitutional legitimacy on any
proposal of importance to Party. As Committee Chair Li Fei emphasized in 2020, the
Committee must incorporate Party leadership into all aspects of its legislative work,
including the unified deliberation of draft laws. Li, supra note 70, at 13-14.
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unconstitutional).
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136
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(discussing November 2020 Party conference at which Xi Jinping set out his thought on
“rule of law” and emphasizing the need for future reforms to adhere to the constitutional
text).
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NPC LAC Constitution Office Deciphers “Pudong New District Regulation”,
supra note 80 (observing that the authorization of SEZs lacked a clear constitutional basis).
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Committee’s functions, can bridge the gap and address changing social
conditions in a manner consistent with leadership objectives.138
The reforms also advance efforts to rationalize the legal system by
strengthening the implementation of central law and policy. Under Xi’s
leadership, the Party has renewed its commitment to legal reform in part to
reinforce the legal system as an instrument to centralize authority and
discipline China’s vast bureaucracy.139 The principal functions of filing and
review are to ensure that central directives are implemented and to reinforce
the unity, stability, and authority of the socialist legal system.140 The 2019
Work Measures on Filing and Review emphasize that legislation is
reviewed to ensure consistency with the Constitution and national law and
with the orders and policies of the Party Central Committee.141 As a work
organ, the LAC’s Filing and Review Office cannot force other state organs
to correct problematic legislation. While recent scholarship suggests that the
LAC has become more assertive on these issues,142 the Constitution and
Law Committee has greater institutional prestige to deploy in coordinating
efforts to resolve legislative conflicts. As such, the Committee arguably
reinforces the filing and review system as an instrument of bureaucratic
discipline.143
Filing and review reforms demonstrate that the Party-state is
mobilizing Chinese citizens to advance this governance objective. The
central government depends on citizen proposals to help it identify and
prioritize conflicts in China’s complex legislative system. As one LAC
publication observed, “Experience proves that it is difficult to discover
138
Han, supra note 74, at 4. See also Sophia Woodman, Legislative Interpretation
by China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee: A Power with Roots in the
Stalinist Conception of Law 229, 236-38 in INTERPRETING HONG KONG’S BASIC LAW: THE
STRUGGLE FOR COHERENCE (Hualing Fu et al. eds. 2007) (discussing the functions of
legislative interpretation in socialist legal systems).
139
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Economic Reform, Anticorruption, and Illiberal Politics, 20 ASIA POLICY 23, 23-29 (July
2015); Zhang & Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 369-71.
140

2017 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 84, § 1.
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2019 Work Measures on Filing and Review, supra note 82, art. 2 (providing
that the NPCSC conducts filing and review work to guarantee the orders and prohibitions
of the Party Central Committee, safeguard the implementation of the Constitution and law,
and protect the legitimate rights and interests of citizens); id. art. 37 (providing that when
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Wei, supra note 85, at 51-52.

Hu, supra note 71, at 80 (noting that the LAC lacks independent status and
arguing that the Constitution and Law Committee, due to its representative status, the
mechanism by which it was created, and its character as a special committee, is in a stronger
position to assist the NPCSC with constitutionality review and to coordinate with other
state organs).
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problems through active review. Only by mustering the enthusiasm of the
masses . . . can we discover unlawful normative documents and address
them in a timely manner.”144 However, the failure of NPC organs to publish
findings or issue responses to citizen review proposals had shaken public
confidence in the system.145 By increasing the transparency of filing and
review work, the Party-state encourages Chinese citizens to identify
legislative conflicts. Such efforts to enlist citizens in monitoring state actors
at lower levels are consistent with other recent reforms, such as amendments
to expand the scope and impact of the PRC Administrative Litigation
Law.146 Public engagement with citizens on review proposals also burnishes
the Party-state’s narrative that it practices “people’s democracy.”147 To the
extent citizen review proposals do not conflict with core Party-state interests,
they may help build momentum for modest reforms that enhance rights on
the margins of the political-legal system. In some respects, the concrete
developments in the filing and review system discussed here may challenge
scholarly assertions that the Constitution is a “false blueprint” or matters to
the Party because it is not a useful mechanism for resolving governance
problems.148
C. Conditioning China’s Political-Legal Landscape to
Manage Constitutional Reform Risks
Writing in 2016, I did not expect the potential legitimacy and
governance benefits of creating a specialized constitutional supervision
organ to prompt China’s leaders to take even the modest step of creating a
constitutional committee with advisory functions. A constellation of
countervailing factors, including the problem of reversing Deng Xiaoping’s
144
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For recent amendments to the Administrative Litigation Law, see He Haibo,
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Litigation Law of the PRC, 13 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 137-190 (2018). As Wang Jing has
argued, the revised law strengthened norms and standards for judicial review of “regulatory
documents” that conflict with higher legislation. Wang Jing, Judicial Review of Regulatory
Documents in China, 16 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 328, 355-58 (2021).
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2021 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note 102, § 2 (explaining that
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not provide solutions to fundamental issues of governance”; resulting constitutional
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rejection of a specialized constitutional committee, the association of such
committees with failed communist regimes, the Party-state’s need for
flexibility in addressing complex constitutional questions, and concerns that
Chinese citizens might leverage a constitutional committee to advance
sensitive constitutional arguments, seemed to tip the balance in favor of
conservatism on this institutional reform question.149
Why did Chinese leaders assess the apparent costs and benefits
differently? As Taisu Zhang and Tom Ginsburg argue in a recent article, the
2018 amendments suggest that the Constitution may have greater
significance in China than many observers assumed.150 In their account, the
growing political importance of the Constitution is the product of mutually
reinforcing factors, including the Party-state’s heavy investment in socialist
legality as a source of governing legitimacy and a tool of central control,
and corresponding societal pressure on the Party-state to live up to its
commitments.151 As discussed above, the creation of the Constitution and
Law Committee could be evidence of such dynamics. The legitimacy
dividends and governance benefits of this reform may simply have had
greater weight in the leadership’s calculus than I expected.
At the same time, the Party-state has taken numerous steps to
manage risks related to reform of the constitutional supervision system.
While Xi has restored and modestly expanded on the constitutional and
legal reforms of the 1990s, he has worked to contain some of the
consequences of earlier stages of reform, including the emergence of the
rights defense movement and citizen constitutional argument. As the rights
defense movement gained momentum in the mid-2000s, senior leaders
identified it as a threat, warning that China must “[e]ffectively guard against
enemy forces,” including those who use “the pretense of rights defense to
engage in sabotage.”152 The strategies and objectives of some rights lawyers
also evolved, from a focus on advocacy in individual cases to civic
organizing and constitutional discourse that challenged China’s

149
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Prospects for a Constitutional Supervision Committee in China, in CHINA’S SOCIALIST
RULE OF LAW REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING 30-44 (John Garrick & Yan Chang Bennett eds.
2016).
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political-legal system more overtly. 153 The Party-state has taken three
interrelated steps to manage these tensions and cripple liberal
interpretations of the Constitution. Although these efforts commenced prior
to 2012, Xi Jinping has strengthened all of them.
First, it has marginalized activist lawyers, liberal scholars, and other
individuals who have raised constitutional arguments. State harassment of
rights activists increased in the mid-2000s.154 Under Xi Jinping, repression
of rights defense lawyers reached a new crescendo in the summer of 2015,
when authorities detained hundreds of lawyers and their affiliates in a
nationwide round-up. 155 The scale of the “709 crackdown,” and the
Party-state’s zeal to publicize detentions, marked an intensification of
efforts to marginalize rights lawyers.156 In the wake of the crackdown, the
Party-state has continued to harass, disbar, and prosecute some lawyers,
co-opted others, and launched new regulatory initiatives to keep the legal
profession in check.157 For example, a 2016 Ministry of Justice directive
instructs law firms to prevent lawyers from using online campaigns or open
letters to “create public opinion pressure” or to “publish or disseminate
speech that denies the fundamental political system firmly established in the
Constitution.” 158 A 2021 All China Lawyers Association directive goes
further and prohibits lawyers from engaging in commentary that “triggers
social conflict,” “incites dissatisfaction with the Party and state,” or
“violates the Party’s line, directives, and policies, denies the leadership of
the Party, or denies socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics.”159
Efforts to marginalize individuals also have targeted constitutional law
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scholars, as the suspension and dismissal of Teng Biao, Zhang Xuezhong,
Xu Zhangrun, and other scholars illustrate.160
The recent indictment of rights lawyer and former law lecturer Xu
Zhiyong provides a vivid example of the Party-state’s determination to
suppress influential constitutional activists. Xu rose to prominence in 2003
as one of three scholars who filed a proposal with the NPCSC challenging
China’s custody and repatriation system.161 Although feted in the state press
for his 2003 effort, Xu later ran afoul of authorities as he pursued more overt
political advocacy. To promote constitutionalism and citizen engagement,
Xu co-founded the Open Constitution Initiative (“OCI”) and, after OCI was
shut down, the New Citizen Rights Movement.162 After serving a four-year
sentence for the crime of “gathering crowds to disrupt public order,” Xu
continued his advocacy, triggering a new detention and more serious
charges of inciting subversion of state power in August 2021. The criminal
indictment against Xu lists a range of “offenses” related to his activism,
including “slander[ing] our [China’s] political system,” advocating
“constitutionalist transition,” promoting “color revolution,” and founding
an “illegal organization.” 163 Even Xu’s defense lawyer has been
marginalized. In November 2021, the Beijing Justice Bureau revoked Liang
Xiaojun’s license to practice law for, among other reasons, “smearing the
foundational systems and basic principles set out in the Constitution
and law.”164
In a second, closely related effort, the Party-state has undertaken a
sustained campaign to condition China’s ideological landscape by
tightening controls over constitutional discourse and advancing
Party-centric constitutional narratives. The Party’s Central Document No. 9,
160
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issued in 2013, cited “intense struggles” in the “ideological situation” and
discussed seven ideological threats. First on this list of threats, which
included promoting civil society, press freedom, and universal values, was
“promoting Western constitutional democracy”:
In commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the enactment
of the [Chinese] Constitution, [some people] hold up the
banners of “defending the constitution” and “rule of law.”
They attack the Party’s leaders for placing themselves above
the constitution, saying China “has a constitution but no
constitutional government.” . . . The point of publicly
proclaiming Western constitutional democracy’s key points
is to oppose the Party’s leadership and implementation of its
constitution and laws. 165
To “strengthen management of the ideological battlefield,” the Party-state
has significantly tightened controls over constitutional discourse in
educational institutions and the media, launched a media campaign
criticizing “constitutionalism,” and removed some constitutional law
textbooks from bookstores. 166 The Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum
Decision and Plan for Building a Rule of Law China (2020-2025) focused
on Party leadership as the core of China’s constitutional system and
emphasized that reforms are subject to this fundamental principle.167 In this
formulation, “implementing the Constitution and law” and preserving Party
supremacy are two sides of the same coin. As Ling Li and Wenzhang Zhou
observe, the intention is to “legalize the Party-state structural link, thus
turning its semi-concealed de facto union with the state into a de jure
marriage.”168 By promoting this conception of the constitutional order more
explicitly, the Party responds to and crowds out competing
constitutional visions.
The leadership’s determination to dominate constitutional discourse
was on full display in the run-up to the 2018 constitutional amendment. As
numerous sources noted, authorities limited public consultation and
165

Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation, CHINAFILE, Nov. 8, 2013,
https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.
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Implications, 74 THE CHINA JOURNAL 91, 94-106 (July 2015); Feng, supra note 160, at 49,
51-56; Xi Wang et al., supra note 116.
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discussion of the amendment package and censored unfavorable views.169
Moreover, even as it injected new transparency into the filing and review
system, the LAC included brief descriptions of only selected citizen review
proposals. By presenting a few carefully curated cases, rather than
publishing a comprehensive database of all citizen review proposals, the
NPCSC and its work organs can deflect attention from the most sensitive
constitutional rights arguments.170
Finally, the Party-state has taken steps to weaken the legal basis for
liberal constitutional arguments. The 2018 amendment to Article 1 of the
Constitution added the phrase, “The defining feature of socialism with
Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China,”
thereby enshrining the principle of Party leadership in the main body of the
Constitution. Before the amendment, references to Party leadership
appeared only in the Preamble. Chinese scholars are divided over the legal
effect of the Preamble, and some conclude that it is not binding.171 This gave
citizens a sliver of textual space to argue that the Constitution should limit
Party power.172 The amendment of Article 1 sidelines such debates. The
Party’s grip on China’s political-legal system is not seriously in question,
and, prior to 2018, Chinese courts occasionally swatted down rights
arguments by citing constitutional provisions conditioning the exercise of
rights on duties to the state, society, and public order.173 In this context, the
fact that the Party attached importance to amending Article 1 demonstrates
its determination to eliminate any remaining legal space that citizens might
leverage to advance rights claims or otherwise challenge its supremacy.
As Xi Jinping has refined this “Thought on Rule of Law” in the years
following the 2018 constitutional amendments, he has woven together
several of the threads discussed here. In a March 2021 article in Qiu Shi, Xi
identified adherence to the Constitution as one of eleven key components
of his thought and then expounded on the essential characteristics of
constitutional governance:
169
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The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China unequivocally stated that to
persist in ruling the country according to law, we must first
persist in ruling the country according to the Constitution,
and to persist in governing according to law, we must first
persist in governing according to the Constitution. When we
speak of ruling the country according to the Constitution and
governing according to the Constitution, there is an essential
difference with so-called “constitutionalism” in the West,
and we can’t confuse the two. Persisting in ruling the country
according to the Constitution and governing according to the
Constitution includes persisting, without wavering, in the
leadership status of the Communist Party of China stipulated
in the Constitution and persisting, without wavering, in the
state system of the people’s democratic dictatorship and
governing form of the people’s congress system stipulated in
the Constitution.
Upholding the unity of state rule by law is a serious political
issue. Our country is a unitary state, and upholding the unity
of state rule by law is extremely important. The Legislation
Law was amended in 2015 and gave cities with districts local
legislative powers. Local legislative work has made positive
progress, and the overall situation is good. But in some
locales, there are still issues with provisions that contravene
higher law, legislative “leakage,” etc., with very negative
impacts. We must strengthen implementation and
supervision of the Constitution, promote the work of
constitutionality review, and firmly correct and annul all
regulations and normative documents that violate the
Constitution and law.174
As a result of the 2018 amendments, Xi can cite to the stipulations of the
Constitution to wrap the principle of Party leadership in a veil of
constitutionality and dismiss Western constitutional theories that have
inspired reformist constitutional arguments. Having set out this core
element of his constitutional theory, Xi can then focus on constitutional
supervision as the solution to a practical governance problem – resolving
legislative conflicts and unifying China’s legal system. His article signals
174

Xi Jinping (习近平), Jianding Buyi Zou Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Fazhi
Daolu Wei Quanmian Jianshe Shehuizhuyi Xiandaihua Guojia Tigong Youli Fazhi
Baozhang (坚定不移走中国特色社会主义法治道路为全面建设社会主义现代化国家
提供有力法治保障) [Resolutely Persist in Taking the Road of Socialist Rule of Law with
Chinese Characteristics, Provide a Strong Rule of Law Guarantee for Comprehensively
Building a Modern Socialist], QIUSHI WANG (求是网) [SEEKING TRUTH NET], no. 5, Feb.
28, 2021, § 4, ¶¶ 2-3, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-02/28/c_1127146541.htm.
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that further institutional developments are likely to concentrate on the filing
and review system and corresponding efforts to clean up conflicting local
legislation, a conclusion supported by contemporaneous statements in the
NPC system.175
Perhaps then, it is appropriate to characterize the creation of the
Constitution and Law Committee and corresponding reforms to the filing
and review system as efforts to refine the narrative of socialist
constitutional supremacy. While the creation of the Committee involves
more than simply a name change, China’s leaders chose one of the weakest
socialist constitutional supervision models, and they did so only after
enhancing the constitutional status of the Party and undertaking a campaign
to marginalize competing constitutional visions. When the recent reforms
are viewed in this context, they demonstrate the Party’s confidence that it
dominates China to such a degree that it can reap the legitimacy and
governance benefits of answering four decades of calls for specialized
constitutional supervision infrastructure without incurring material risks of
unintended consequences. The Constitution may be important in Xi’s China,
but as an instrument of central control, not as a tool for rights enforcement.
As one scholar remarked in assessing the impact of Poland’s constitutional
tribunal prior to 1989, the reform presents “the illusion of constitutional
legality without challenging [the system’s] most fundamental
assumptions.”176
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Commentary by NPCSC leaders places heavy emphasis on the filing and
review of legislation as a focal point for people’s congress constitutional supervision. See,
e.g., Yang Zhenwu (杨振武),Laolao Bawo “Sige Jiguan” Dingwei Yaoqiu Quanmian
Jiaqiang Xin Shidai Renda Gongzuo He Jianshe (牢牢把握“四个机关”定位要求全面
加强新时代人大工作和建设) [Firmly Grasp the Positional Demands of the “Four
Organs” and Comprehensively Strengthen People’s Congress Work and Construction in
the New Era], QIUSHI WANG (求是网) [SEEKING TRUTH NET], No. 22, Nov. 16, 2021, § 4,
¶¶ 2, 4. Similarly, the LAC’s 2021 Filing and Review Work Report closely tracks Xi’s
language in identifying priority issues. 2021 Filing and Review Work Report, supra note
102, §§ 5, 6, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2021-11/16/c_1128064618.htm
(strengthening guidance of local people’s congresses, carrying out research on “legislative
leakage,” and carefully handling constitutionality related issues among key issues of focus
in 2021 and 2022).
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